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P r e f a c e  
Th i s  case  s tudy  i s  p a r t  of a l a r g e r  e f f o r t  devoted t o  t h e  
s tudy  of  c e r t a i n  environmental  measures connected w i t h  o i l  
development i n  t h e  North Sea. I n  t u r n  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  s u b j e c t  
has  been p a r t  of t h e  programme management t a s k  i n  t h e  Management 
and Technology Area a t  IIASA. The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  c a s e  s tudy  
s i g n a l l e d  t h e  beginning of  a new resea rch  t a s k ,  t h a t  o f  d i s a s t e r  




The o i l  blowout problem h a s  r e c e i v e d  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e n t i o n  
a s  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  o i l  h a s  been c a r r i e d  f u r t h e r  o f f s h o r e .  Most 
s c i e n t i f i c  e f f o r t  h a s  been on t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  s i d e  v i a  p r e d i c t i o n s  
of  blowouts  and changes i n  d e s i g n  of  t h e  p l a t f o r m s .  Few s t u d i e s  
h a s  focussed  on o i l  blowouts  once t h e y  have o c c u r r e d .  
T h i s  paper  i s  a  c a s e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  o i l  blowout  t h a t  o c c u r r e d  
on t h e  Bravo p l a t f o r m  i n  t h e  Ekof i sk  f i e l d  i n  t h e  Norwegian 
s e c t o r  o f  t h e  Nor th  Sea .  The pr imary d a t a  i n c l u d e d  i n t e r v i e w s  
w i t h  t h e  group who d i r e c t e d  t h e  Norwegian government r e sponse  t o  
t h i s  blowout.  Other  d a t a  came from p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t s  made 
a v a i l a b l e  soon a f t e r  t h e  i n c i d e n t .  
The pape r  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  p h y s i c a l  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  blowout and 
t h e  e x i s t i n g  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  guided t h e  i n i t i a l  r e s p o n s e s  from 
P h i l l i p s  Pe t ro leum and Norway. These p r i n c i p l e s  a r e  s u b j e c t e d  
t o  a  c r i t i q u e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  and s t r u c t u r i n g  of  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  f a c i n g  P h i l l i p s  and  Norway a s  t h e y  responded t o  t h i s  
crisis.  
The government a c t o r s  i nvo lved  i n  t h e  blowout r e s p o n s e  and 
t h e i r  r o l e s  a r e  a l s o  b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e d .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  
made by t h e  Norwegian Ac t ion  Group a r e  c l a s s i f i e d  and d e s c r i b e d .  
Fol lowing t h i s  e f f o r t  a  q u a l i t a t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n  i s  o f f e r e d  o f  
t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s .  
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A Dec i s ion  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
O i l  and Gas Blowout a t  Bravo P la t fo rm 
On A p r i l  22, 1977, an o f f s h o r e  o i l  well went o u t  o f  c o n t r o l  
t h a t  s i g n a l l e d  to t h e  Nor th  Sea o i l  i n d u s t r y  and governments and, 
indeed ,  t o  t h e  rest  of  t h e  world t h a t t h e  Nor th  Sea had now come 
of  a g e  i n  j o i n i n g  o t h e r  o i l  p roducing  a r e a s  i n  e x p e r i e n c i n g  a major 
blowout.  From t h i s  t i m e  t o  t h e  r e g a i n i n g  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  Bra'vo 
w e l l  o f  t h e  Ekof i sk  f i e l d  on  A p r i l  30 a  maximum o f  21,300 t o n s  o f  
o i l  escaped  from t h e  w e l l .  [ l l  T h i s  escaped  o i l  r e p r e s e n t s  
revenue  l o s s  t o  both  t h e  o i l  company owning t h e  w e l l  and t o  t h e  
Norwegian government owning t h e  subsea. c h e l f ,  u t i l i t y  loss i n  t h e  
p r o d u c t s  and s e r v i c e s  fo regone ,  p o t e n t i n l  and a c t u a l  damage t o  
t h e  marine environment ,  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s  i n  meet ing  t h e  emergency 
i t s e l f ,  and p o s s i b l e  compensation t o  any i n j u r e d  p a r t i e s .  
THE ACCIDENT AT THE BRAVO PLATFORM 
The blowout a t  t h e  Bravo o f f s h o r e  w e l l  o c c u r r e d  w h i l e  main- 
t enance  work was be ing  unde r t aken  on a  p r o d u c t i o n  w e l l  on  a p l a t -  
form hous ing  f o u r t e e n  o t h e r  w e l l s .  While t h e  au tomat i c  blowout 
p r e v e n t e r  v a l v e s  worked on  t h e s e  o t h e r  w e l l s  t h e  w e l l  under  main- 
t e n a n c e  went o u t  o f  c o n t r o l .  The s p e c i f i c  c a u s e s  o f  t h i s  blowout 
w e r e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  by an  independent  commission set up by t h e  
Norwegian government. T h e i r  r e p o r t  w a s  s u b m i t t e d  on  Oc tobe r  1 0 ,  
1977. [2] Any combinat ion o f  c a u s e s  i n c l u d i n g  a l s o  p r e d i c t i o n  o f  
s u b s u r f a c e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  poor  w e l l  d e s i g n ,  poor c r e w  t r a i n i n g  and 
i n e f f e c t i v e  s u p e r v i s i o n  by company and government p e r s o n n e l  can  
be invo lved .  [3]  However, a t  Bravo p l a t f o r m  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  c a u s e  
of t h e  blowout was found t o  be t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  and ad in in i s t r a -  
t i v e  systems be ing  inadequa te  t o  a s s u r e  a s a f e  w e l l  workover 
o p e r a t i o n .  [4] 
A comment a t t r i b u t e d  t o  Red Ada i r ,  t h e  famed tamer o f  o i l  
w e l l s  w h i l e  h e  was i n  Norway a f t e r  t e n d i n g  t o  t h e  w e l l  a t  Bravo, 
n o t e s  t h a t  he  h a s  tended  t o  more blowouts  caused  d u r i n g  t h e  r e p a i r  
o r  maintenance of  p r o d u c t i o n  w e l l s  t h a n  from t h e  d r i l l i n g  o f  
e x p l o r a t i o n  w e l l s .  H i s  s t a t e m e n t  w a s  c o r r o b o r a t e d  by t h e  Bravo 
Commission Report  : 
"A w e l l  workover i s  a  major  t a s k  t h a t  is performed 
compara t ive ly  r a r e l y .  Expe r i ence  shows t h a t  t h e  
blowout h a z a r d  i s  g r e a t e r  f o r  such  work t h a n  f o r  
any o t h e r  work performed on t h e  f i e l d  i n  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  phase."  [5] 
Such s t a t e m e n t s  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l l y  h e l d  Norwegian v iew 
t h a t  e x p l o r a t i o n  w e l l s  have t h e  h i g h e s t  blowout p o t e n t i a l .  [ 6 ]  
C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a need f o r  b e t t e r  a c c e s s i b l e  r e c o r d s  on t h e  
o c c u r r e n c e  and c a u s e s  o f  blowouts .  
This  s tudy ,  however, does n o t  focus  on t h e  cause  o f  t h e  
blowout o r  on i t s  preven t ion .  Rather  t h e  emphasis i s  on t h e  
management of t h e  c r i s i s  i t s e l f  a f t e r  t h e  blowout occur red .  
While a t t e n t i o n  of  a n a l y s t s  has  been d i r e c t e d  t o  r i s k  assessment  
of  p o s s i b l e  blowouts [71  less e f f o r t  has  been s p e n t  on t h e  
management of  such blowouts once they  occur .  The coping s t r a t -  
e g i e s  employed i n  an emergency s i t u a t i o n  can  o f t e n  r e v e a l  t h e  
p r i o r i t i e s  of  t h e  c o r e  a c t o r s  i n  t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  r e sponses  t o  a  
s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n .  Indeed,  n o t  only  a r e  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  re- 
vea led  b u t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  taken a s  w e l l  a s  t h o s e  r e j e c t e d  can 
r e v e a l  t h e  way i n  which t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s  o p e r a t e s .  Thus, 
t h i s  s e c t i o n  does  n o t  a t t empt  t o  d e t a i l  t h e  a c t u a l  and pending 
impacts  from t h e  Bravo blowout b u t  i n s t e a d  seeks  t o  o u t l i n e  t h e  
r o l e s  of  t h e  a c t o r s  involved,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  seen  a s  f e a s i b l e  
and t h e  d e c i s i o n s  a c t u a l l y  t aken .  Where p o s s i b l e  some evalua-  
t i o n  i s  made of t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s .  
The blowout a t  Bravo c o n s i s t e d  of a  maximum o f  2,830 t o n s  
of  o i l  and 1,410 t o n s  of  g a s  p e r  every  24 hours  f o r  a lmost  e i g h t  
days .  [ 8 ]  No comple te ly  a c c u r a t e  measure of  t h e s e  o i l  and g a s  
l o s s e s  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  Fore ign m a t t e r  i n  t h e  format ion  i t s e l f  o r  
i n  t h e  p roduc t ion  p i p e  cou ld  have reduced t h e  f low o f  o i l  and 
g a s .  F r e s s  r e p o r t s  a t  t h e  t i m e  of  t h e  i n c i d e n t  noted  f i g u r e s  
va ry ing  from 4,000 t o  7,000 t o n s  o f  o i l  pe r  day which exceeded 
t h e  company s t a t e d  t h e o r e t i c a l  maximum; however, no b a s e s  w e r e  
g iven  f o r  such f i g u r e s .  
The escaping mix tu re  i s  o f  a  l i g h t  c o n s i s t e n c y  f o r c e d  
through t h e  w e l l  head a t  a  nea r  b o i l i n g  t empera tu re  and under 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  h igh  p r e s s u r e .  The mixture  s h o o t s  above t h e  
p l a t f o r m  i n  t h e  form o f  a  s p r a y  where a  p o r t i o n  of  t h e  o i l  i_s 
evapora ted  b e f o r e  it c o n t a c t s  t h e  water  s u r f a c e .  The g a s ,  of  
course ,  i s  n e a r l y  e n t i r e l y  evapora ted .  A s  t h e  o i l  i s  spray ing  
o u t  of  t h e  w e l l  head it is be ing  mixed w i t h  water  from t h e  s p r s y  
of  a  f i r e  b o a t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  h o t  o i l  from s t a r t i n g  a  f i r e  o r  t h e  
g a s  i g n i t i n g  an  explosi.on which could  d e s t r o y  t h e  p la t fo rm.  
The r e s u l t i n g  o i l  s l i c k  formed on t h e  w a t e r s  surrounding 
t h e  Bravo p l a t f o r m  was brown i n  c o l o u r  and 1-2mm t h i c k .  The 
mixing a c t i o n  o f  t h e  winds and waves a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  water  s p r a y  
from t h e  f i r e  v e s s e l  caused emuls i fy ing  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  occur  
changing t h e  c o l o u r  and composi t ion o f  t h e  s l i c k .  The assumption 
of  t h e  Action Group is  t h a t  50% of t h e  blown-out o i l  evapora ted  
i n t o  t h e  atmosphere whi le  n a t u r a l  degrada t ion  of  t h e  remaining 
o i l  emulsions caused t h e  s l i c k  t o  d i s i n t e g r a t e .  The s i z e  o f  
t h i s  i n t e r m i t t e n t  s l i c k  covered a n  a r e a  of  approximately 4000 Krn 
i n  va ry ing  degrees  of  t h i c k n e s s  and contaminat ion  i n  Norwegian 
waters with  on ly  a  s m a l l  p o r t i o n  reach ing  i n t o  t h e  Danish s e c t o r .  
The s l i c k  d i d  n o t  move toward t h e  c o a s t  a s  i n i t i a l l y  f e a r e d  b u t  
remained i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  v i c i n i t y  downwind from t h e  blowout source  
through t h e  combined e f f e c t  o f  t h e  winds and c u r r e n t s .  The move- 
ment of i n v i s i b l e  d i s s o l v e d  o i l  beyond t h i s  a r e a  i s  unknown. The 
r a t e  of sp read  of  t h e  main s l i c k  was less t h a n  one Km p e r  hour.  
Observa t ions  from d a i l y  a i r  f l i g h t s  showed t h a t  t h e  s l i c k  was 
r e l a t i v e l y  s t a t i o n a r y  and would e v e n t u a l l y  become completely 
d i s i n t e g r a t e d  under n a t u r a l  weather c o n d i t i o n s .  Few lumps were 
expected  t o  reach t h e  Norwegian c o a s t ,  t h e  a r e a  of  g r e a t e s t  
p o t e n t i a l  damage. 
Not only  was t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t  t h e  f i r s t  major blowout i n  
t h e  North Sea b u t  it was a l s o  t h e  f i r s t  major o i l  l o s s  i n  t h e  
Norwegian s e c t o r .  Previous  i n c i d e n t s  had on ly  occur red  i n  t h e  
UK s e c t o r  from t a n k e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  minor i n c i d e n t s  from p la t fo rms .  
There fo re ,  no exper ience  had y e t  evolved i n  Norway f o r  responding 
t o  emergencies connected wi th  l a r g e  o f f s h o r e  o i l  s p i l l s .  Th i s  
l a c k  of e x p e r i e n c e ' i s  n o t  t o  say ,  however, t h a t  Norway was n o t  
prepared  o r  expec t ing  such emergencies.  I t  simply had n o t  d e a l t  
wi th  t h e  a c t u a l  problems surrounding t h e s e  o f f s h o r e  i n c i d e n t s .  
THE PRINCIPLES ESTABLISHED BEFORE BRAVO 
The government of Norway had a s t z L l i s h e d  c e r t a i n  p r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  d e a l i n g  wi th  emergencies connecteL d i t h  o f f s h o r e  o i l  develop- 
ment i n  t h e  North Sea be fo re  t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t .  [9] These 
p r i n c i p l e s  can be summarized under f o u r  headings:- 
1. p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  o p e r a t o r :  
assignment  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  where 
t h e  o p e r a t o r . m u s t  be a b l e  t o  meet eve ry  s i t u a t i o n  
which might occur ,  
requirement  t o  keep a v a i l a b l e  t h e  most advanced 
technology a t  any t i m e  f o r  meeting t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  
assignment  of unl imi ted  l i a b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
f o r  a l l  damages and c o s t s  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  
s i t u a t i o n ,  
e requirement  f o r  an o p e r a t o r ' s  p l a n  f o r  meeting 
p o s s i b l e  s i t u a t i o n s  a s  they  may a r i s e .  
2 .  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  r e g u l a t o r :  
e approval  of  o p e r a t o r  p l a n s  and o p e r a t i o n s  through 
t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  e x p e r t  agenc ies  coord ina ted  by t h e  
O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  of t h e  Min i s t ry  o f  I n d u s t r y  and 
C r a f t s ,  
government superceding o p e r a t o r  when o p e r a t o r  deemed 
unable t o  hand le  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  o r  t h e  r i s k  of g r e a t  
damage i s  p r e s e n t ,  
e c r e a t i o n  of r e g i o n a l  emergency response  c e n t e r s  
a long t h e  c o a s t  and s u b s i d i z a t i o n  o f  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  
f o r  responding t o  emergencies t o  supplement o p e r a t o r  
e f f o r t s .  
3 .  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  w e l l  c o n t r o l :  
e prime emphasis on sav ing  human l i f e ,  e .g . ,  ensur ing  
t h e  s a f e t y  of p la t fo rm workers,  
a s topp ing  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  f low of  o i l  a t  t h e  w e l l  
head a s  t h e  main o b j e c t i v e  i n  combatt ing a blowout. 
4 .  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l :  
a o p e r a t o r  c o n t a i n i n g  and c a p t u r i n g  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  a s  
n e a r  a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  t h e  source  of f low, e .g . ,  
c l e a r i n g  t h e  o i l  i n  t h e  open s e a ,  
a emphasis on mechanical  means f o r  s topp ing  o i l  
p o l l u t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  us ing  chemical  d i s p e r s a n t s ,  
a government p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  r e s e a r c h  and development 
on such mechanical  means, 
a n a t i o n a l  government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  c o a s t l i n e  on a c o s t  recovery  b a s i s  from t h e  
o p e r a t o r .  
The Bravo i n c i d e n t  provided t h e  f i r s t  r e a l  t e s t  of  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l i t y  of  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s .  While many of t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  
s e e m  t o  be obvious some of them c a r r y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  a p r i o r i  
wculd appear  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  adequacy o f  response  by both  o p e r a t o r  
and r e g u l a t o r .  
The assignment  of  i n i t i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  t o  
be a b l e  t o  m e e t  every  s i t u a t i o n  which might  occur  and wi th  t h e  
most advanced technology i s  i n  r e a l i t y  c o n s t r a i n e d  by economics. 
The o p e r a t o r  g e n e r a t e s  i t s  own response  system f o r  meeting t h i s  
p r i n c i p l e  governed by i t s  cash  f low p o s i t i o n .  Of f shore  o p e r a t o r s  
t h e r e f o r e  r e l y  p r i m a r i l y  on  p reven t ion  technology r a t h e r  t h a n  on 
o i l  c lean-up t echno logy .  T o  avo id  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  o i l  l o s s e s  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  i s  a n  o b j e c t i v e  o v e r r i d i n g  i n  
importance t h e  clean-up of such o i l  once it is  i n  t h e  s e a .  
Given t h e  secondary importance of clean-up it i s  n o t  s u r -  
p r i s i n g  t h a t  o p e r a t o r s  would n o t  i n v e s t  h e a v i l y  i n  advanced 
clean-up technology.  F i r s t ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  r e l y  on one au tomat ic  
blowout p r e v e n t e r  v a l v e  50 meters below t h e  seabed and a n o t h e r  
manually a c t i v a t e d  a t  t h e  wel lhead.  These v a l v e s  w e r e  cons ide red  
f a i l s a f e  by both t h e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  and t h e  government r e g u l a t o r s  
involved.  [ l o ]  Second, t h e  o p e r a t o r s  r e l y  on chemical  d i s p e r s a n t s  
which a r e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  UK government, b u t  c u r r e n t l y  n o t  t o  
t h e  Norwegian government. The o p e r a t o r s '  assumption seemed t o  
be t h a t  i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  Norway would a l low t h e  use  of  
chemical  d i s p e r s a n t s  r a t h e r  than  a c c e p t  c o a s t a l  damage from o i l  
p o l l u t i o n .  C e r t a i n l y ,  chemical  d i s p e r s a n t s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e  i n  
reducing p o s s i b l e  economic l i a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t o r  s i n c e  t h e y  
remove t h e  o i l  from t h e  s u r f a c e .  Th i rd ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  r e l y  on 
i n d u s t r y  e x p e r t s  i n  s topp ing  blowouts who a r e  n o t  r e s i d e n t  t o  
t h e  North Sea a r e a .  No r e t a i n e r  is pa id  t o  t h e s e  e x p e r t s  t o  
m a i n t a i n  a p resence  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y ,  t h e r e f o r e  it must be  assumed 
t h a t  it is  cheaper  t o  have a n  ad hoc o u t s i d e  w e l l  c o n t r o l  response  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t o  deve lop  an i n t e r n a l  w e l l  c o n t r o l  c a p a b i l i t y  o r  t o  
ma in ta in  a r e g u l a r  l o c a l  response  c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  o u t s i d e  
e x p e r t s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  assume t h a t  t h e i r  p r e v e n t i o n  
t e c h n o l o g i e s  so l i m i t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of blowouts t h a t  g iven t h e  
government 's  p o s i t i o n  o f  o v e r r i d i n g  t h e  o p e r a t o r  a t  any t i m e  it 
i s  cheaper  t o  pay t h e  government on a c o s t  r ecovery  b a s i s  f o r  
c lean-up  t h a n  t o  i n v e s t  h e a v i l y  i n  advanced clean-up t e c h n o l o g i e s  
themselves which could  t h e n  go unused, e v e n t u a l l y  become o b s o l e t e  
through advanced d e s i g n  o r  prove  unworkable. These s u g g e s t i o n s  
appea r  t o  be v a l i d  r e a s o n s  why t h e  o p e r a t o r s  d o  n o t  i n v e s t  i n  
advanced o i l  p o l l u t i o n  clean-up t e c h n o l o g i e s  even though t h e  
Norwegian government a c t s  on t h e  assumption t h e y  do  s o .  
With l i t t l e  economic i n c e n t i v e  e x i s t i n g  f o r  o p e r a t o r s  t o  
f u l l y  comply w i t h  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n i t i a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t h e  government a l s o  h a s  problems wi th  t h i s  p r i n -  
c i p l e .  Through primary r e l i a n c e  on t h e  o p e r a t o r  t o  p r e v e n t  and 
respond t o  blowouts t h e  government would n o t  a p r i o r i  r a p i d l y  
b u i l d  up a l a r g e  r e sponse  c a p a b i l i t y  i t s e l f .  Other  more immediate 
demands on t h e  government budget  could  i n t e r v e n e  t o  r educe  t h e  
k ind  of supplementary r e sponse  necessa ry .  Thus, t h e  government 
cou ld  be f o r c e d  t o  r e l y  on o u t s i d e  zx!;e.t-.ts and t h e  o i l  i n d u s t r y  
i t s e l f  s i n c e  it would n o t  have t h e  o f f - " s e t t i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  and 
in fo rma t ion  b a s e  t o  form i t s  own adequate  and s u s t a i n e d  r e sponse  
t o  a blowout.  T h i s  s i t u a t i o n  can s e t  t h e  s t a g e  f o r  a c r i s i s  
approach t o  blowouts r a t h e r  t h a n  a r a t i o n a l  r e sponse .  However, 
on ly  e lements  of t h i s  problem e x i s t e d  a s  t h e  Norwegian government 
had c r e a t e d  and approved a c o a s t a l  r e sponse  programme and funded 
it a t  an adequate  l e v e l  f o r  comple t ion  i n  Spr ing  1978, a y e a r  
a f t e r  t h e  Bravo blowout occur red .  
The p r i n c i p l e  of  u n l i m i t e d  l i a b i l i t y  a l s o  c a r r i e s  w i t h  it 
an  economic c o n s t r a i n t  s i n c e  t h e r e  is some economic l i m i t  t o  
o p e r a t o r  l i a b i l i t y .  Opera to r s  i n s u r e  t h e i r  blowout' r i s k  by 
sp read ing  such r i s k  w i t h  insu rance  companies which i n  t u r n  sp read  
t h e i r  r i s k  among s t i l l  o t h e r  i n s u r a n c e  companies. I n s u r a n c e  
companies have some r i s k  l i m i t  of l i a b i l i t y  based on t h e i r  
a s ses smen t s  of  t h e  r i s k  involved  and t h e  laws governing  such  
r i s k .  There is a 1974 agreement l i m i t i n g  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  damages 
from each i n c i d e n t  t o  $25 m i l l i o n ,  a l though  Norway does n o t  
r ecogn ize  t h i s  l i m i t .  A t  p r e s e n t  o p e r a t o r s  a c c e p t  t h i s  l i m i t ,  
b u t  n i n e  European governments a r e  a t t empt ing  t o  r a t i f y  a n o t h e r  
agreement r a i s i n g  t h i s  l i m i t  t o  $35 m i l l i o n  and t h e n  t o  $ 4 5  
m i l l i o n  f i v e  y e a r s  l a t e r .  [ l l ]  
Thus, t h e  government cannot  assume t h e r e  i s  no c e i l i n g  t o  
t h e  l i a b i l i t y  of  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  of i t s  o i l f i e l d s .  I n  o t h e r  s e n s e ,  
t h e  f i n a l  l i a b i l i t y  o f  damages from a blowout r e s t s  w i t h  t h e  
owner of  t h e  seabed,  t h e  government r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  coun t ry  of 
Norway. Any o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  s u s t a i n i n g  damages from a blowout 
i n  t h e  Norwegian s e c t o r  o f  t h e  North Sea may have t h e  r i g h t  t o  
s e e k  compensation from Norway i t s e l f  o r  one o f  its n a t i o n a l  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  Norway th rough  S t a t o i l  i s  
becoming an o p e r a t o r  i n  i t s  own r i g h t  a s  w e l l  a s  be ing  a m a j o r i t y  
owner of  f i e l d s  o p e r a t e d  by p r i v a t e  companies. 
The p r i n c i p l e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  most advanced r e s p o n s e  
technology i s  s u b j e c t  t o  economics a s  w e l l .  A t  any p o i n t  i n  
t ime t h e  o p e r a t o r  a s  t h e  c h o i c e  of  o p t i n g  f o r  s t o c k i n g  e x i s t i n g  
t echnology o r  w a i t i n g  f o r  a n o t h e r  advance i n  technology b e f o r e  
choo,sing a  p a r t i c u l a r  d e s i g n .  With t h e  above p r i n c i p l e  no 
guidance  is  g i v e n  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  f o r  making t h i s  c h o i c e  a l though  
a  p e n a l t y  seemingly a c c r u e s  shou ld  t h e  wrong c h o i c e  be made by 
o p t i n g  f o r  a  g iven  technology t o o  soon. The b a s i c  guidance  
a v a i l a b l e  i s  from t h e  manufac tu re r s  o f  such  t e c h n o l o g i e s  who a r e  
prone  t o  e x a g g e r a t e  t h e  performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  d e s i g n s .  For  example,  i n  t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t  t h e  
skimmers used  proved on ly  25% e f f e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r  c la imed c a p a c i -  
t ies  which a r e  de termined f o r  i d e a l  c o n d i t i o n s  which r a r e l y  
e x i s t .  [121 An o p e r a t o r  can  a l s o  d e c i d e  between under t ak ing  i t s  
own r e s e a r c h  programme i n  c lean-up  technology o r  i n v e s t i n g  i n  a  
g iven  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e s i g n .  Once an o p e r a t o r  h a s  i n v e s t e d  i n  a  
g iven  d e s i g n  it has  an  i n c e n t i v e  n o t  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n  r e s e a r c h  
which would r e n d e r  its own inves tmen t  o b s o l e t e  b e f o r e  i t s  payout  
p e r i o d .  
T h i s  technolo'gy problem becomes more a c u t e  when coupled  w i t h  
t h e  l a c k  o f  any means t o  r e a l l y  m e e t  a blowout and t o  c lean-up  
o i l  p o l l u t i o n  from such  a  blowout .  A s  t h e  government admi ts :  1131 
"The o p e r a t o r s  have l i t t l e  equipment w i t h  which 
t o  m e e t  a major  blowout.  Under t h e  e x i s t i n g  
r u l e s  t h e  o p e r a t o r s  are r e q u i r e d  t o  have such 
equipment ,  b u t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  have n o t  y e t  . 
imposed s p e c i f i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  . . ." 
"However it is clear t h a t  no mechanica l  means 
a r e  a v a i l a b l e  a t  p r e s e n t  which would be e f f e c -  
t i v e  under  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  wind and s e a  
p r e v a i l i n g  i n  t h e  areas under  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  r e l a t i n g  t o  d i s p e r s a n t s  
must a l s o  be imposed." 
" I f  a blowout shou ld  occur  t h e r e  would n o t  be 
enough chemica ls  i n  t h e  North Sea a r e a  f o r  
e f f e c t i v e  o i l  s p i l l  t r e a t m e n t . "  
Given t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s  it was obvious  t o  b o t h  o p e r a t o r s  and 
government t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  emergency p l a n  was i n  r e a l i t y  a 
good i n t e n t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n  a c t u a l  means f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  and 
c l e a n i n g  up blowouts .  I n  t h i s  case it would n o t  be  s u r p r i s i n g  
t h a t  emergency p l a n s  of  o f f s h o r e  o p e r a t o r s  w e r e  i n a d e q u a t e  and 
t h a t  t h i s  inadequacy was w e l l  known t o  t h e  government a u t h o r i t i e s .  
Thus, it i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  s i n c e  such p l a n s  w e r e  n o t  r e a l l y  
c a p a b l e  of b e i n g  a d e q u a t e l y  f u l f i l l e d  t h e y  w e r e  n o t  g iven  s t r o n g  
c redence  i n  t h e  d r i l l i n g  p e r m i t  o r  w e l l  programme approva l  p r o c e s s .  
However, t h e  government d i d  approve  a set  of s p e c i f i c  r equ i remen t s  
i n  t h e  Summer o f  1976 f o r  equipment and gave t h e  o p e r a t o r s  one 
y e a r  t o  m e e t  them. 
The p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e l y i n g  on mechanica l  means f o r  r e spond ing  
t o  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  on t h e  sea i n s t e a d  of t h e  cheape r  and proven 
chemica l  d i s p e r s a n t s  w a s  n o t  w e l l  r e c e i v e d  by t h e  o i l  companies 
because  of t h e  g r e a t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  damage, t h e  
g r e a t e r  expense  i n v o l v e d ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  proven e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
such  means and t h e  l a c k  of  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " b e s t  a v a i l a b l e " .  Also  
t h e  UK was committed t o  chemica l s  i n  i t s  produc ing  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  
North Sea .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  Norwegians c o n t i n u e d  t o  h o l d  o u t  
f o r  p r imary  r e l i a n c e  on t h e  mechanica l  means o f  booms and  skimmers 
t o  c o n t a i n  and c a p t u r e  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  even though t h e s e  means were 
known t o  be i n a d e q u a t e  i n  t h e  open s e a .  Because o f  g e n u i n e  
o p e r a t o r  s k e p t i s m  l i t t l e  company r e s e a r c h  was done on  mechan ica l  
means, a l t h o u g h  BP i n  t h e  UK had deve loped  a  skimmer f o r  u s e  i n  
t h e  h igh  s e a s .  Thus,  t h e  Norwegian government was a l m o s t  a l o n e  
i n  r e l y i n g  on t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  mechanica l  means which meant t h a t  
i t s  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  had t o  be proven by them even though t h e  
o p e r a t o r s  i n  t h e o r y  w e r e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  most advanced d e s i g n s  
i n  such  means. 
A l a r g e  government r e s e a r c h  programme was n o t  fo r thcoming ,  
a l t h o u g h  some funds  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  p r i v a t e  m a n u f a c t u r e r s  f o r  
r e s e a r c h  on such  d e v i c e s .  No t r a in j . r . 2  grogramme f o r  boom and 
skimmer o p e r a t o r s  e x i s t e d .  Oniy l i m i t s d  f u n d s  w e r e  a l l o c a t e d  t o  
m u n i c i p a l i t i e s  f o r  pu rchase  of mechanica l  means to  p r o t e c t  t h e i r  
s h o r e l i n e .  The demons t r a t i on  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  government e f f o r t  
was n o t  l o s t  on t h e  o i l  companies who t ended  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  d e l a y  
on t h e  n e c e s s a r y  inves tmen t .  A t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t ,  
however, t h e  government and t h e  o i l  companies had a g r e e d  on a  
mechanica l  d e s i g n  and o r d e r s  had been g i v e n  f o r  such d e v i c e s  by 
b o t h  t h e  government and t h e  o p e r a t o r s .  
The u n d e r l y i n g  p r i n c i p l e  f o r  r e spond ing  t o  an  o i l  b lowout  
f o r  b o t h  p r e v e n t i o n  and  c o n t r o l  can be c o n v e n i e n t l y  summarized: 
t h e  Norwegian r e g u l a t o r s  r e l y  on t h e  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
t o  h a n d l e  t h e  blowout problem, e . g . ,  t h e y  b a s e  much o f  t h e i r  
r e g u l a t o r y  a c t i v i t i e s  on t h e  o p e r a t o r ' s  own s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  i t s  
o i l  e x p l o r a t i o n  and p r o d u c t i o n  a c t i v i t i e s .  [13.5] Such a  sys t em 
o f  s u p e r v i s i o n  r e q u i r e s  a  good and c o n t i n u i n g  knowledge o f  t h e  
o p e r a t o r ' s  s u p e r v i s o r y  c a p a b i l i t y  and t h e i r  p l a n s  and a l t e r n a t i v e  
r e s p o n s e s  t o  e x p e c t e d  and unexpected e v e n t s .  
The d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  s u g g e s t  
t h e  c o n t e x t  i n  which t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t  o c c u r r e d .  The "criticism" 
i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e s e  a  p r i o r i  p r i n c i p l e s  i n  no way 
a p p l y  t o  t h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  Bravo by t h e  o p e r a t o r  o r  t h e  government.  
THE ACTION GROUP 
Any crisis  b r i n g s  a b o u t  a  c o a l i t i o n  i n  what would no rma l ly  
b e  s e e n  a s  a d i v e r s e  and d i s a s s o c i a t e d  set of a c t o r s .  These 
c o n n e c t i o n s  between a p p a r e n t l y  s e p a r a t e  a c t o r s  r e a d i l y  become 
v i s i b l e  i n  t h e  c a s e  of t h e  Bravo i n c i d e n t ,  and a  sys tem o f  actors 
w i t h  s h a r e d  i n t e r e s t s  i s  demons t r a t ed  i n  t h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  
crisis .  E l 4 1  The e x i s t e n c e  of t h e  Bravo problem p rov ided  n o t  
o n l y  a  means t o  t e m p o r a r i l y  b r i n g  d i v e r s e  a c t o r s  t o g e t h e r  t o  end 
t h e  crisis  b u t  it a l s o  t h r e a t e n e d  f u t u r e  o f f s h o r e  o i l  development  
n o r t h  of 620 i n  Norway and  f u t u r e  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  such  development  
by o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  i n  o f f s h o r e  a r e a s .  
The c o r e  a c t o r s  inc luded t h e  Act ion  Group a s  key r e g u l a t o r .  
The ,Act ion  Group was an  ad hoc response  s i n c e  it was n o t  i n  
e x i s t e n c e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  blowout,  a l though  it had been under a c t i v e  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  some t i m e  before  Bravo. [15]  T h i s  Group was 
c r e a t e d  by t h e  Environment Min i s t e r  a b o u t  s i x  hours  a f t e r  t h e  
blowout occur red .  The Group was g iven  t h e  necessa ry  ad  hoc 
a u t h o r i t y  from t h e  government t o  expend monies and commit t h e  
government t o  whatever a c t i o n s  and expenses  deemed a p p r o p r i a t e  
i n  responding t o  t h e  Bravo crisis.  I f  f e a s i b l e  major problems 
w e r e  t o  be p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  Min i s t e r  f o r  d e c i s i o n .  Four days 
l a t e r  on A p r i l  26 a  permanent Action Group was fo rmal ized  by 
Royal Decree f o r  ma in ta in ing  a quasi-permanent response  mechanism 
f o r  such a c c i d e n t s .  
The Act ion  Group's composi t ion was based on t h e  assumed 
needs of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  Bravo: [16] 
measures t o  c o n t r o l  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  - S t a t e  P o l l u t i o n  
Cont ro l  A u t h o r i t y  
measures t o  c o n t r o l  o i l  f low - O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  
p r o v i s i o n  of  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and pe r sonne l  - Navy 
p r o v i s i o n  of  r e scue  and s a f e t y  - P o l i c e .  
Leadership  was assumed by t h e  D i r e c t o r  of t h e  S t a t e  P o l l u t i o n  
Cont ro l  Author i ty  who r e p o r t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  of  Envi- 
ronment. One r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from P h i l l i p s  Petroleum was l i a i s o n  
t o  t h e  Act ion  Group. Had a t a n k e r  o i l  s p i l l  been involved t h e  
Marine D i r e c t o r a t e  would have been involved i n s t e a d  of  t h e  O i l  
D i r e c t o r a t e .  L a t e r  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from t h e  M i n i s t r y  of Fore ign 
A f f a i r s  who s p e c i a l i z e d  i n  handl ing  in fo rmat ion  f o r  t h e  f o r e i g n  
p r e s s  was a t t a c h e d  a s  l i a i s o n .  
The Action Group performed i n  a  r e t i c u l i s t  r o l e  [17] because 
it was a f o c a l  p o i n t  r e p r e s e n t i n g  f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c y  sys tems,  
t h r e e  w i t h i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  government, one  from l o c a l  government 
and t h e  p r i v a t e  o p e r a t o r .  T h i s  r e t i c u l i s t  group a c t e d  a s  an 
a s s e s s o r  of  t h e  blowout s i t u a t i o n  a t  t h e  i n t e r f a c e  of  t h e  broad 
development and environment p o l i c y  systems.  The major d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  t h e  r e t i c u l i s t  r o l e  i s  t h a t  t h e  Action Group 
had d e c i s i o n  a u t h o r i t y  g ran ted  t o  it by t h e  M i n i s t e r  of Environ- 
ment which a f f e c t e d  a l l  p o l i c y  systems r e p r e s e n t e d .  The judge- 
ments of t h i s  Group, however, w e r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  through t h e  res- 
p e c t i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  a c t i o n s  d e s i r e d ,  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  
Act ion  Group r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  hub o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  network. 
The Action Group's  t a s k s  w e r e  t o  a s s i s t  P h i l l i p s  Pet ro leum 
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  o i l  f low a t  t h e  w e l l  and t o  c r e a t e  a  back-up 
response  f o r  c o n t r o l l i n g  and c l e a n i n g  up t h e  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  from 
t h e  w e l l .  The Act ion  Group's f i r s t  p r i o r i t y  was t o  a i d  P h i l l i p s  
t o  s t o p  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l e d  f low o f  o i l .  T h i s  t a s k  was under t h e  
d i r e c t  s u p e r v i s i o n  of t h e  O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  and 
c a r r i e d  o u t  through P h i l l i p s  Petroleum, owner and o p e r a t o r  of  
Bravo p la t fo rm.  The Action Group had no d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  a t  Bravo; r a t h e r  it surveyed and c o n t r o l l e d  
t h e  measures sugges ted  by t h e  o p e r a t o r .  [18]  
The n e x t  p r i o r i t y  came under t h e  ae.gis of  t h e  S t a t e  P o l l u t i o n  
Cont ro l  Author i ty  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  which involved a l e r t i n g  o t h e r  
North Sea c o u n t r i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  c o a s t a l  communities i n  Norway and 
p repar ing  a response  t o  c a p t u r e  and c o n t a i n  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  b e f o r e  
it reached t h e  c o a s t l i n e .  Th i s  e f f o r t  was accomplished through 
d i r e c t  s u p e r v i s i o n  of an ad hoc government containment  e x e r c i s e  
invo lv ing  a v a r i e t y  of pe r sonne l ,  equipment and v e s s e l s  from 
many d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s .  
A f t e r  being formed t h e  Action Group was faced  wi th  d e c i d i n g  
what t o  do. Severa l  key a l t e r n a t i v e s  were open t o  t h e  Act ion  
Group, inc lud ing  t h e  t iming of implementation of such a l t e r n a t i v e s .  
The f i r s t  s e t  of a l t e r n a t i v e s  c e n t e r e d  around t h e  o rgan i sa -  
t i o n  of t h e  Action Group i n  r e l a t i c ~ i  t o  o t h e r  governmental bod ies  
a s  w e l l  a s  t o  P h i l l i p s  Petroleum. F igure  1 shows t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
of t h e  Action Group t o  o t h e r  impor tant  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi th  Bravo. A s  i s  r e a d i l y  seen t h e  Action Group played t h e  
c e n t r a l  and a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r o l e  i n  combatt ing t h e  o i l  blowout of 
Bravo. 
The Action Group checked P h i l l i p s '  p l a n s  f o r  d e a l i n g  wi th  
t h e  blowout and i t s  r e s u l t i n g  p o l l u t i o n .  Afterward P h i l l i p s  was 
asked t o  p r e p a r e  a  new p l a n  t o  meet t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  
decided by t h e  Action-Group.  This  d r a f t  p l a n  was prepared  and 
p resen ted  t o  t h e  O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  who checked t h i s  d r a f t  f o r  i t s  
t e c h n i c a l  a s p e c t s .  Then P h i l l i p s  p resen ted  t h e s e  r e v i s e d  p l a n s  
t o  t h e  Action Group f o r  approval .  The O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  r e p r e s e n t -  
a t i v e  cor robora ted  t h e i r  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  and t h e  Action Group 
approved t h e  p l a n s .  A c o n s t a n t  moni tor ing  of P h i l l i p s '  o p e r a t i o n s  
was a l s o  undertaken.  
The Action Group a l s o  c l o s e l y  monitored t h e  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  
containment e f f o r t  of  P h i l l i p s  a s  it d i d  wi th  t h e  w e l l  c o n t r o l  
problem. The Action Group and P h i l l i p s  worked o u t  a  containment  
p l a n  and implemented it through t h e  Navy a s  t h e  on-the-scene 
s u p e r v i s o r .  A v a r i e t y  of groups and equipment were coord ina ted  
and u n i t e d  i n t o  responding t o  t h e  o i l  p o l l u t i o n .  
The o t h e r  r o l e  envisaged f o r  t h e  Action Group c o n s i s t e d  of 
i t s  being s o l e l y  a  c o o r d i n a t i n g  group. Th i s  c o o r d i n a t i n g  r o l e  
would have allowed P h i l l i p s  Petroleum and t h e  O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  t o  
assume more l e a d i n g  r o l e s  i n  t h e  response  t o  t h e  blowout. I n  
t h i s  c a s e  t h e  government would have been i n  a  p a s s i v e  p o s i t i o n  
responding t o  i n i t i a t i v e s  from P h i l l i p s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  emphasis 
would have been on c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  blowout wi th  a  lesser e f f o r t  
on i t s  r e s u l t i n g  p o l l u t i o n .  V i o l a t i o n  of e s t a b l i s h e d  government 
p r i n c i p l e s  would a l s o  have been p o s s i b l e .  
The d i r e c t  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r o l e  taken by t h e  Action Group 
stemmed from t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t h e  government can  
t a k e  over  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  i f  it deems t h a t  t h e  r i s k  of  g r e a t  damage 
I MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT I 
experts  
( s l i c k  direc-  
I , Exogenous 
Containment *
vesse l s  
( s l i c k  
foreign gov t ' s ,  
media 
DIRECTOR OF ACTION GROUP & STATE POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY 












from O i l  
Directorate 
State 
t ion  Control 
Authority 
? .r t T 
I I I I 
I I 1 
Pollut ion 
Ph i l  l i p s  O i l  Defence Control Relief Centre 
Petroleum Directorate Ministry Authority 
( r e l i e f  d r i l l -  
ing & o i l  





i s  p r e s e n t .  [19] Thus, t h e  o p e r a t o r  was aware t h a t  t h e  government 
cou ld  t a k e  ove r  t h e  company o p e r a t i o n  a t  any t i m e .  During t h e  
t i m e  p r i o r  t o  t h e  fo rma t ion  and t a k e  ove r  by t h e  Ac t ion  Group 
P h i l l i p s  Pe t ro leum was a l r e a d y  engaged i n  employee r e s c u e ,  f i r e  
p r e v e n t i o n ,  s p r a y i n g  w i t h  chemica l  d i s p e r s a n t s  and a s s e s s i n g  w e l l  
capping  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
THE ALTERNATIVES FACING THE ACTION GROUP 
The g e n e r a l  f l o w  of o p e r a t i o n s  and a l l o c a t i o n  of  r e s o u r c e s  
t o  p reven t  and c o n t r o l  an  o i l  blowout a s  w e l l  a s  c o n t a i n  i t s  o i l  
s l i c k  is shown i n  F i g u r e  2 .  T h i s  g e n e r a l i z e d  scheme r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  s t a g e s  i n  an o i l  blowout from i t s  i n i t i a l  p r e v e n t i o n  t o  i ts  
f i n a l  a b s o r p t i o n  i n t o  t h e  n a t u r a l  environment .  Between each  
s t a g e  is  t h e  f low of o i l  t h a t  e s c a p e s  t h e  p r e v i o u s  e f f o r t  i n  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  s t o p  t h a t  f low.  A t  each of t h e s e  s t a g e s  env i ron-  
menta l  impacts  occur  from t h i s  escaped o i l .  The amount of o i l  
e scap ing  wi th  i t s  r e s u l t i n g  envi ronmenta l  impact  i s  d i r e c t l y  
c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  amount of  r e s o u r c e s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e s e  s t a g e s  
t o  r educe  t h e  e scape  of such o i l .  Any o i l  blowout programme 
r e q u i r e s  r e s o u r c e s  t o  be 2 l l o c a t e d  f o r  p r e v e n t i o n ,  c o n t r o l  and 
a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  e f f o r t s  a t  any one t i m e  i n  o r d e r  t o  minimize env i -  
ronment impacts  from o i l  blowouts  and  p o l l u t i o n .  Over-concent ra t ion  
of l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  i n  any one a r e a  w i l l  l e a v e  t h e  rest o f  t h e  
system a t  a  d i sadvan tage  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  unprevented ,  u n c o n t r o l l e d  
o r  l o o s e  o i l  i n  t h e  environment .  
From t h i s  more g e n e r a l  system a l t e r n a t i v e s  can be d i s p l a y e d  
f o r  p r e v e n t i o n ,  c o n t r o l  and r e t a r d i n g  p o l l u t i o n .  F i g u r e  3 shows 
key p r e v e n t i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  which w e r e  t o  have been i n  p l a c e  p r i o r  
t o  t h e  Bravo blowout. S i n c e  t h e  blowout o c c u r r e d  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  
system used was n o t  f a i l s a f e .  Although t h i s  s t u d y  d o e s  n o t  d i s -  
c u s s  t h e  p r e v e n t i o n  system pe r  se it i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  b r i e f l y  
show i t s  u s u a l  e x t e n t .  [ 2 0 ]  
The p r e v e n t i o n  system beg ins  wi th  w e l l  p l a n n i n g  which i n c l u d e s  
c a r e f u l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  s t r a t a  t o  be p e n e t r a t e d .  From t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and p r e d i c t i o n  come t h e  w e l l  l o c a t i o n ,  d e s i g n  and 
d r i l l i n g  programme. The l a t t e r  s t r e s s e s  t h e  equipment t o  be used ,  
t h e  c a s i n g  s i z e  and d e p t h s ,  t h e  d r i l l i n g  mcd programme and any 
s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  necessa ry  f o r  t h e  o p e r a t o r s .  The w e l l  opera-  
t i o n  i s  based on e f f e c t i v e  s u p e r v i s i o n  and con t inuous  moni to r ing  
of t h e  d r i l l i n g  p r o c e s s .  Monitor ing c o n s i s t s  of  lower ing  a  d e v i c e  
i n t o  t h e  w e l l  t o  a s s e s s  t h e  d r i l l  b i t  a s  it c u t s  and a n a l y s i n g  
t h e  d r i l l  c u t t i n g s  and d r i l l i n g  mud a t  t h e  s u r f a c e  as t h e y  cir-  
c u l a t e  back from t h e  d r i l l i n g .  W e l l  maintenance i s  a n  e s p e c i a l l y  
impor tan t  t i m e  a s  t h e  d r i l l  s t r i n g  i s  p u l l e d  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  c a s i n g s  
which r e t a i n  t h e  shape  of  t h e  s h a f t .  Mud f low and d e n s i t y  are of  
p a r t i c u l a r  importance a t  t h i s  t i m e  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  w e l l ' s  p r e s s u r e  
ba lance .  F i n a l l y ,  should  t h e  w e l l  p r e s s u r e  begin  t o  go  o u t  of  
b a l a n c e  d u r i n g  d r i l l i n g  o r  maintenance a  r a p i d  ad jus tmen t  i n  t h e  
d r i l l i n g  v a l v e  can  be a c t i v a t e d  e i t h e r  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  o r  manual ly 
t o  s h u t  down t h e  w e l l  should  t h e  w e l l  p r e s s u r e  become t o o  g r e a t  
t o o  q u i c k l y  t o  a d j u s t  t h e  mud f low.  
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Should a blowout  a c t u a l l y  o c c u r  r e g a i n i n g  w e l l  c o n t r o l  
becomes o f  paramount impor tance .  F i g u r e  4 o u t l i n e s  t h e  consecu-  
t i v e  s t e p s  r e q u i r e d  for  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  r e g a i n  w e l l  c o n t r o l ,  e . g . ,  
o b t a i n  p r e s s u r e  c o n t r o l .  The f i r s t  l i n e  o f  d e f e n s e  c o n s i s t s  o f  
t h e  blowout  p r e v e n t e r  v a l v e s  (BOP), t h e  a u t o m a t i c  subsea  BOP 
v a l v e  and t h e  manual s u r f a c e  BOP v a l v e .  Should  t h e s e  BOP v a l v e s  
n o t  work mud pumping must  b e  s t e p p e d  up t o  r e g a i n  c o n t r o l  o f  w e l l  
p r e s s u r e ;  i n d e e d  mud pumping b e g i n s  a s  soon a s  w e l l  p r e s s u r e s  
b e g i n  t o  rise and b e f o r e  t h e  manual s u r f a c e  BOP v a l v e  must  b e  
s h u t .  A t  t h e  same t i m e  a f i r e  p r e v e n t i o n  s p r a y  programme is  
begun t o  dampen t h e  r i g  and  a l l o w  s h u t - o f f  o f  a l l  w e l l s  on t h e  
r i g .  Rescue o f  r i g  p e r s o n n e l  a l s o  o c c u r s  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  s o  t h a t  
t h e  u s e  of  BOP v a l v e s ,  pumping o f  d r i l l i n g  mud, o t h e r  w e l l  s h u t -  
downs on t h e  r i g ,  f i r e  p r e v e n t i o n  and p e r s o n n e l  r e s c u e  a r e  a l l  
o c c u r r i n g  a t  r e l a t i v e l y  t h e  same t i m e .  
A f t e r  t h e  r i g  is  abandoned t o  t h e  o i l  blowout from t h e  uncon- 
t r o l l e d  w e l l  t h e n  work commences on a  capp ing  o p e r a t i o n .  The 
capp ing  e f f o r t  can b e  i n i t i a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  o p e r a t o r  b u t  
u s u a l l y  o u t s i d e  e x p e r t s  a r e  c a l l e d  i n  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  c a p  t h e  blow- 
o u t .  E i t h e r  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  c a p p i n g ,  i n  l i e u  o f  capp ing  or 
i f  c app ing  f a i l s  a  r e l i e f  w e l l  must be  d r i l l e d  n e a r  t h e  uncon- 
t r o l l e d  w e l l  t o  pump mud i n t o  t h e  o i l  r e s e r v o i r .  I f  t h i s  d r i l l i n g  
e f f o r t  f a i l s  t h e n  t h e  w e l l  c o n t i n u e s  o u t  o f  c o n t r o l  i n  a  blowout  
c o n d i t i o n  u n t i l  a l l  o f  t h e  o i l  and g a s  i s  burned  o u t .  
While  t h i s  w e l l  c o n t r o l  e f f o r t  i s  underway work i s  s i m u l t a n -  
e o u s l y  begun on comba t t i ng  t h e  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  spewing from t h e  
w e l l .  The b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e  gove rn ing  t h i s  a n t i - p o l l u t i o n  work i s  
t o  c a p t u r e  a s  much o f  t h e  o i l  a s  i s  p o s s i b l e  n e a r e s t  t h e  p o i n t  
o f  l o s s .  [21] The a l t e r n a t i v e s  open t o  mee t ing  t h i s  s p r e a d i n g  
o i l  p o l l u t i o n  t h r e a t  a r e  shown i n  F i g u r e  5. The f i r s t  t h r e e  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  o f  d i s p e r s e ,  c o n t a i n  o r  d e s t r o y  a r e  open f o r  a  
dec is ion-maker  because  n a t u r a l  decompos i t i on  i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  
o c c u r r i n g .  D e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  i s  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
minor o i l  s p i l l s  because  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a p p l y i n g  t h e s e  
measures  and  t h e i r  dependence on w e a t h e r ,  l o c a t i o n ,  d e g r e e  o f  
c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  o i l  s l i c k  and m a t e r i a l s  r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  
The two b a s i c  a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  m a j o r  o i l  s p i l l s  i n c l u d e  i ts  
d i s p e r s a l  o r  con ta inmen t .  Both o f  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  have  
o p p o s i t e  e f f e c t s  s o  t h a t  one  c a n n o t  b e  e f f e c t i v e l y  u s e d  i f  t h e  
f i r s t  employed d o e s  n o t  work. Al though d i s p e r s a n t s  can  b e  
a p p l i e d  a t  any t i m e  t h e y  a r e  t h e  most  e f f e c t i v e  when t h e  o i l  i s  
f r e s h ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  d e c i s i o n  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t a i n  and c a p t u r e  
t h e  o i l  s l i c k  i s  t o  f o r e g o  e f f e c t i v e  chemica l  d i s p e r s a l .  Each 
o f  t h e s e  two a l t e r n a t i v e s  h a s  s p e c i a l  problems i n  t h e i r  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n .  The main d i s a d v a n t a g e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  d i s p e r s a n t s  i s  
t h e i r  h i g h  p o s s i b l e  impac t s  on t h e  mar ine  envi ronment .  Even 
g i v e n  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  however,  t h e s e  chemica l  d i s p e r s a n t s  have  
"been t h e  most  employed on  t h e  Norwegian c o n t i n e n t a l  s h e l f " .  [22] 
T h e i r  wide u s e  s t e m s  f rom t h e i r  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  r a p i d  deployment ,  
r e a s o n a b l e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  unde r  n a v i g a b l e  wea the r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
r e l a t i v e l y  low c a p i t a l  cost and  l a c k  o f  need f o r  t r a i n e d  o p e r a t o r s .  


The a d v a n t a g e s  o f  chemica l  d i s p e r s a n t s  a r e  t h e  e x a c t  d i s -  
a d v a n t a g e s  of mechan ica l  con ta inmen t  and c a p t u r e  o f  o i l  s l i c k s .  
Mechanical  sys t ems  are d i f f i c u l t  t o  mount, i n e f f e c t i v e  under  
modera t e ly  bad wea the r  c o n d i t i o n s ,  have h i g h  c a p i t a l  c o s t  and  
r e q u i r e  t r a i n e d  o p e r a t o r s .  Even though t h e s e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  a r e  
p r e s e n t  mechanica l  sys t ems  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  o f  i n t e r e s t  because  o f  
t h e i r  advan tages  o f  " removal  o f  p o l l u t i o n  p o t e n t i a l ,  no e c o l o g i c a l  
consequences ,  c la imed h i g h  and s u s t a i n e d  r e c o v e r y  rates and 
r e l a t i v e l y  low o p e r a t i n g  c o s t s " .  [ 2 3 f  
S p i l l  s i z e  and l o c a t i o n  as w e l l  a s  wind and c u r r e n t  d i r e c t i o n  
are t h e  c r u c i a l  f a c t o r s  i n  a e c i d i n g  which o f  t h e s e  two b a s i c  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  employ. These f a c t o r s  a r e  o f  impor tance  even  i f  
t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  of  r e l i a n c e  i s  on one sys tem or t h e  o t h e r .  
Shore  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  i m p o r t a n t  because  t h e  c o a s t a l  zone i s  
t h e  area o f  g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  e c o l o g i c a l  damage. A l so ,  t h e  c o s t s  
o f  s h o r e  c lean-up  a f t e r  t h e  o i l  r e a c h e s  t h e  c o a s t l i n e  are v e r y  
h i g h  because  of  i t s  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i t y .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  emphasis  
i s  on d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  b e f o r e  it r e a c h e s  coastal waters. 
The key t r a d e - o f f  h e r e  i s  o i l  on t h e  s h o r e  vexsus  c h e m i c a l s  i n  
t h e  sea. 
Some sequenc ing  o f  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  i m p o r t a n t .  
D i r e c t l y  a round t h e  s o u r c e  of  t h e  o i l  b lowout  chemica l  d i s p e r s a l  
i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  remove t h e  f i r e  haza rd  t o  t h e  o f f s h o r e  p l a t f o r m .  
A t  s e a  e i t h e r  d i s p e r s a n t s  o r  con ta inmen t  c a n  b e  used ,  w h i l e  i n -  
s h o r e  b a r r i e r s ,  conta inment  and c lean-up  a r e  r e q u i r e d .  
The a l t e r n a t i v e s  and r e s o u r c e s  f o r  blowout p r e v e n t i o n ,  w e l l  
c o n t r o l  and p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  and clean-up have  been p r e s e n t e d  
i n  t h e  l a s t  t h r e e  f i g u r e s .  These  a l t e r n a t i v e s  have been d i s p l a y e d  
t o  show what t h e  ~ c t i o n  Group c o u l d  have d e c i d e d  upon i n  t h e i r  
a t t e m p t  t o  m e e t  t h e  Bravo blowout .  However, a n o t h e r  series o f  
" a l t e r n a t i v e s "  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e i r  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
r e s p o n s e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  w e l l  and p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l .  T h i s  
a r r a y  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  e v e n t s  t h a t  c o u l d  have  t a k e n  
p l a c e  a t  t h e  t i m e  of  t h e  blowout  a t  Bravo o r  i f  t h e  blowout  had 
o c c u r r e d  a t  a n o t h e r  l o c a t i o n  and t i m e .  T a b l e  1 l is ts  t h e  major 
e v e n t s  t h a t  a r e  p o s s i b l e  t o  o c c u r  i n  a  North Sea  o i l  b lowout  
s i t u a t i o n .  
While it would be o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  c o n s t r u c t  a d e c i s i o n  and 
e v e n t s  tree, none of t h e  e v e n t s  i n  T a b l e  1 a c t u a l l y  t o o k  p l a c e  
d u r i n g  t h e  Bravo o i l  b lowout .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  t h e  judgement o f  t h e  
D i r e c t o r  o f  t h e  Ac t ion  Group, t h e  r e s p o n s e  t o  Bravo was a l r e a d y  
a t  t h e  l i m i t .  Had any combina t ion  o f  t h e s e  e v e n t s  been p r e s e n t  
o r  coup led  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s e s  chosen  much g r e a t e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
and damage would have c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  Bravo blowout .  C l e a r l y ,  
t h e  Bravo e v e n t  i n  i t s e l f  p r o v i d e d  a  v a l u a b l e  " t r a i n i n g  e x e r c i s e "  
f o r  f u t u r e  blowouts  under  more a d v e r s e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Table  1 POSSIBLE EVENTS INFLUENCING THE RESPONSES TO AN 
OFFSHORF. O I L  BLOWOUT 
THE DECISIONS MADE AT BRAVO 
PROBLEM 
Well 
Contro l  
- 
P o l l u t i o n  
Contro l  
The d e c i s i o n s  made a t  Bravo a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
t h e  major o u t l i n e  of  Norwegian responses  t o  o i l  blowouts i n  
f u t u r e .  P r i n c i p l e s  of  o p e r a t i o n  were bo th  e s t a b l i s h e d  o r  con- 
f i rmed by t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s .  The b a s i c  d e c i s i o n s  l i s t e d  i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  w e r e  provided by t h e  D i r e c t o r  of t h e  Act ion  Group a s  w e l l  
a s  from t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  by t h i s  Group t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  of 
Environment. F i g u r e  6 shows t h e  o u t l i n e  of  t h e s e  d e c i s i o n s  based 
on t h i s  in fo rmat ion .  
The f i r s t  major  d e c i s i o n  was t h e  appointment  of t h e  Action 
Group by t h e  M i n i s t e r  of Environment, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  necessa ry  
a u t h o r i z a t i o n  t o  make d e c i s i o n s  i n  t h e  name of  t h e  ~ o r w e g i a n  
Government. Th i s  d e c i s i o n ,  of  course ,  was b a s i c  t o  t h e  e n t i r e  
o p e r a t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  Bravo. The government provided i t s  
backing t o  t h e  Act ion  Group where t h e  M i n i s t e r  of I n d u s t r y  and  
t h e  M i n i s t e r  of  Environment worked t o g e t h e r  i n  s u p p o r t  of it. 
Thus, t h e  l e a d i n g  government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  development 
and environment p o l i c y  systems w e r e  i n  u n i t y  i n  responding t o  t h e  
Bravo crisis .  The D i r e c t o r  of t h e  Act ion  Group was a l s o  t h e  
r 
POSSIBLE EVENTS 
Blowouts from o t h e r  w e l l s  on r i g  
F i r e  and exp los ion  on r i g  
Loss of r i g  i n  exp los ion  
Casing r u p t u r e d  below s e a  l e v e l  
Subsea w e l l  blow away from r i g  
Prolonged stormy weather  
Winter da rkness  
Towing and placement of r e l i e f  r i g  
Another blowout elsewhere i n  North Sea 
Prolonged stormy weather 
St rong i n s h o r e  c u r r e n t s  
Winter tempera ture  i n c r e a s e s  b r i t t l e n e s s  o f  booms 
Winter da rkness  
Migra t ion  t i m e s  and r o u t e s  
Spawning t i m e s  a n d  s i tes  
Major dec i s ion  on composition 
and a u t h o r i t y  of Action Gro.up 
Well c o n t r o l  Po l lu t ion  Control  
Major dec i s ion  on capping Major dec i s ion  on use  
and r e l i e f  dril ls  a t  same time of mechanical means 
Minor dec i s ions  on production 
stoppage,  e s t a b l i s h  s a f e t y  zone 
t- -- .c 
Minor dec i s ions  on degree of s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  
types  of equipment, mobi l iza t ion  of 
shore  p ro t ec t ion  
M a j ~ r  dec i s ion  on l e t t i n g  
o i l  s l i c k  d r i f t  and 
Minor dec i s ion  on demobil izing 
shore  p ro t ec t ion  
Fiqure 6 OUTLINE OF MAJOR AND MINOR DECISIONS OF ACTION GROUP ESTABLISHED TO COMBAT 
BRAVO BLOWOUT 
D i r e c t o r  of t h e  S t a t e  P o l l u t i o n  Contro l  Author i ty  s o  t h a t  t h e  
Group func t ioned  under t h e  immediate d i r e c t i o n  of  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
from t h e  environment p o l i c y  system who, i n  t u r n ,  r e p o r t e d  d i r e c t l y  
t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  Environment. There fo re ,  whi le  a  union between 
government development and environment c o r e  a c t o r s  e x i s t e d ,  t h e  
environmental  a c t o r s  w e r e  i n  t h e  l e a d  r o l e .  The b a s i c  premise 
was t h a t  t h e  ~ r a v o  blowout was a  n a t i o n a l  emergency r e q u i r i n g  a  
u n i f i e d  n a t i o n a l  response .  The i d e a  of a  c o o r d i n a t i n g  Action 
Group was r e j e c t e d  a s  t o o  p a s s i v e  and r e a c t i v e  i n  f avour  of a  
Group capab le  of being u n i f i e d  around a c t i o n s  stemming from t h e i r  
own assessments  and d e c i s i o n s .  Th i s  key d e c i s i o n  of  a u t h o r i t y  and 
and u n i t y  c e n t e r e d  i n  an ad hoc Action Group i s  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  
e n t i r e  Bravo response .  Th i s  i n i t i a l  d e c i s i o n  was f u r t h e r  co r ro -  
bora ted  by t h e  government when it e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  Action Group a s  
a  permanent body days  l a t e r .  [ 2 4 ]  
The i m p l i c a t i o n  of  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  was n o t  on ly  t o  guaran tee  
a  u n i f i e d  response  i n  t h e  government b u t  a l s o  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  
command r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  P h i l l i p s  Petroleum. Under p rev ious  
p r i n c i p l e s  P h i l l i p s  a s  owner and o p e r a t o r  of  t h e  Bravo p l a t f o r m  
was cons ide red  t o t a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  blowout and f o r  meeting 
t h e  crisis brought  on through t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n .  P h i l l i p s  was t o  
t a k e  whatever s t e p s  w e r e  necessa ry  t o  s t o p  t h e  blowout and t o  
r e s t r i c t  t h e  damage from t h e  blowout. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  P h i l l i p s  had 
accep ted  un l imi ted  l i a b i l i t y ,  i n c l u d i n g  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  a c t i o n s  
made by t h e  government i n  i t s  response .  Th i s  l i a b i l i t y  p o s t u r e  
w a s  reconfirmed by t h e  Act ion  Group. 
What had n o t  been decided o r  known p r i o r  t o  Bravo was whether 
t h e  o p e r a t o r  o r  t h e  government would t a k e  t h e  l e a d  r o l e  i n  t h e  
response  t o  t h e  crisis. A l l  t h a t  had been known a  p r i o r i  was t h a t  
t h e  government cou ld  t a k e  over  t h e  management of t h e  crisis i f  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  demanded it. No g u i d e l i n e s  e x i s t e d  t o  d e f i n e  t h e s e  
c i rcumstances .  The government, i n  accordance w i t h  t h i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
p r i n c i p l e ,  dec ided immediately t o  t a k e  over  t h e  e n t i r e  o p e r a t i o n  
and t o  d i r e c t  P h i l l i p ' s  r e sponses  t o  t h e  blowout. Thus, t h e  
company became s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h e  government even though t h e  
company was t o  both  c a r r y  o u t  t h e  work and pay f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  
o p e r a t i o n .  
POLLUTION CONTROL DECISIONS 
The second major  d e c i s i o n  emerged from t h e  a u t h o r i t y  assumed 
by t h e  Action Group i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  P h i l l i p s .  T h i s  d e c i s i o n  
involved t h e  t o t a l  r e l i a n c e  on mechanical  means t o  s t o p  o i l  
p o l l u t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  r e l y  on chemical  d i s p e r s a n t s .  Much of t h e  
t i m e  of  t h e  Act ion  Group was s p e n t  i n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h i s  i s s u e .  
I t  was f i n a l l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  M i n i s t e r  o f  Environment f o r  f i n a l  
approva l  because of i t s  s i g n a l  importance.  Th i s  d e c i s i o n  had 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s i z e  and degree  o f  t h e  e f f o r t  and hence 
expense necessa ry  t o  combat o i l  p o l l u t i o n ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  r i s k s  
of  o i l  r e a c h i n g  t h e  c o a s t l i n e  through t h e  d e l a y  o f  g e t t i n g  
mechanical  d e v i c e s  i n  p l a c e  and t h e i r  unproven o p e r a t i o n a l  
f e a s i b i l i t y ,  and t h e  p receden t  f o r  f u t u r e  o p e r a t i o n s  connected 
w i t h  major  o i l  s p i l l s .  P o l i t i c a l  r i s k  was invo lved  a s  Norway 
h a s  a  s t r o n g  p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  i t s  f i s h e r i e s  and  f i s h i n g  
i n d u s t r y .  The judgement of "no chemica l s "  meant c o n t i n u e d  
p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i n c i p l e  of  mechanica l  
con ta inmen t .  
I n  i t s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  P h i l l i p s '  p l a n s  and a c t i o n s  t h e  
A c t i o n  Group found t h a t  P h i l l i p s  had no mechanica l  equipment  o r  
t r a i n e d  p e r s o n n e l  f o r  same on hand e i t h e r  o f f s h o r e  o r  i n  Norway. 
I n  f a c t ,  P h i l l i p s  had o n l y  chemica l s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  meet ing  o i l  
p o l l u t i o n  from i t s  o f f s h o r e  p l a t f o r m s ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
had r e l i e d  s o l e l y  on chemica l  means f o r  d i s p e r s i n g  o i l  p o l l u t i o n .  
The r e l i a n c e  on chemica l s  may be  s e e n ,  however, a s  an i n t e r i m  
measure u n t i l  P h i l l i p s  was a b l e  t o  comply w i t h  government r e g u l a -  
t i o n s  pas sed  i n  November 1976 t o  have on hand an  o i l  p o l l u t i o n  
c lean-up  c a p a c i t y  o f  8 ,000 t o n s  p e r  day .  The blowout o c c u r r e d  
i n  t h e  d e l a y  between t h e  government p a s s i n g  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  and 
having  it implemented by t h e  o p e r = r t c ~ s .  [26] 
The f i r s t  twelve  h o u r s  a f t e r  t h e  b l o ~ ~ r o u t  P h i l l i p s  had been 
u s i n g  chemica l s  f r e e l y  i n  i t s  e f f o r t  t o  d i s p e r s e  t h e  o i l .  
P h i l l i p s  o n l y  s topped  when o r d e r e d  t o  do s o  by t h e  A c t i o n  Group 
t h e  day a f t e r  t h e  blowout .  [ 2 7 ]  Around t h e  p l a t f o r m ,  however, 
P h i l l i p s  was a l lowed t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  us2  c h e m i c a l s  t o  d i s p e r s e  
o i l  t o  r educe  f i r e  haza rd .  A s  a  back-up measure  P h i l l i p s  was 
a l s o  a l l owed  t o  b r i n g  chemica l s  and s p r a y  v e s s e l s  o u t  t o  t h e  
a r e a  f o r  e v e n t u a l  u s e  i f  deemed n e c e s s a r y  by t h e  Ac t ion  Group. 
P h i l l i p s  r e q u e s t e d  t h e  Ac t ion  Group t o  approve i t s  p l a n  f o r  a 
combined u s e  o f  mechanica l  and chemica l  means; however, a f t e r  a 
d i s c u s s i o n  w i t h  s c i e n t i s t s  and o t h e r  e x p e r t s  t h e  u s e  o f  c h e m i c a l s  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  be  p r o h i b i t e d .  
S i n c e  t h e  Ac t ion  Group p l a c e d  t o t a l  r e l i a n c e  on mechan ica l  
means s e v e r a l  o t h e r  lesser d e c i s i o n s  and e f f o r t s  became i m p o r t a n t .  
These more minor  d e c i s i o n s  i nvo lved  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  a c c u r a c y  o f  
, s u r v e i l l a n c e  and f o r e c a s t i n g  o f  t h e  decompos i t i on  and movement 
of  t h e  o i l  s l i c k ,  t h e  t y p e s  of mechanica l  means t o  u s e  i n  t h e  
a t t e m p t  t o  c o l l e c t  t h e  o i l ,  and t h e  m o b i l i z a t i o n  o f  a c o a s t a l  
p r o t e c t i o n  e f f o r t .  
Two f l i g h t s  w e r e  made d a i l y  t o  o b s e r v e  and photograph  t h e  
o i l  s l i c k .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a  n a v a l  v e s s e l  was d i s p a t c h e d  t o  t a k e  
c h a r g e  of t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  e f f o r t  and t o  r e p o r t  on t h e  decompos i t i on ,  
s p r e a d  and movement of  t h e  o i l  s l i c k .  A l so  P h i l l i p s  mounted i ts  
own a e r i a l  e f f o r t  t o  document t h e  development  o f  t h e  s l i c k .  The 
method t h a t  evo lved  c o n s i s t e d  o f  hav ing  a n  a i r c r a f t  f o l l o w  t h e  
c o n t o u r s  o f  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  w h i l e  b e i n g  t r a c e d  on t h e  r a d a r  by t h e  
navy command v e s s e l  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y .  
The key problems invo lved  i n  t h e s e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  e f f o r t s  w e r e  
t h e  number o f  a i r c r a f t  from o t h e r  n a t i o n s  i n v o l v e d  i n  m o n i t o r i n g  
t h e  o i 1 : s l i c k  and t h e  t h i n n i n g  and p a t c h i n g  of  t h e  s l i c k  i t s e l f  
o v e r  t i m e .  During Norwegian a i r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  a t  any one  t i m e  
Swedish,  Danish ,  German, E n g l i s h  and NATO a i r c r a f t  c o u l d  be i n  
t h e  v i c i n i t y  p l o t t i n g  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  e s t i m a t e s  of  t h e  movement 
of t h e  s l i c k .  I n e v i t a b l y  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  w e r e  n o t  i n  t o t a l  
agreement bu t  more impor tan t ly  a i r  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  became a 
problem through d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  s a f e t y  zone 
over  t h e  p l a t f o r m  v i c i n i t y .  The g r a d u a l  t h i n n i n g ,  sp read ing  and 
break-up of  t h e  s l i c k  i n t o  pa tches  meant t h a t  t o  ma in ta in  t h e  
i n i t i a l  degree  o f  accuracy g r e a t e r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  e f f o r t  would 
have t o  be mounted. The Action Group dec ided  n o t  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  
mainta in  t h e  same element of accuracy b u t  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  s l i c k  
i n  more g e n e r a l  terms. 
The n e x t  minor d e c i s i o n  proved t o  be o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f i -  
c u l t y ,  t h a t  o f  what types  of booms and skimmers t o  employ. What- 
e v e r  mechanical  equipment a v a i l a b l e  i n  Norway f o r  u s e  on h igh  
s e a s  was flown i n t o  t h e  Act ion  Group's c e n t e r  of o p e r a t i o n s .  
Both P h i l l i p s  and Norwegian a i r c r a f t  and v e s s e l s  were used i n  
t r a n s p o r t i n g  t h e  booms and skimmers t o  t h e  s i t e  o f  o p e r a t i o n .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  two Swedish c o a s t  guard v e s s e l s  wi th  booms and 
skimmers were reques ted  t o  work a t  Bravo. Many o t h e r  o f f e r s  of  
equipment w e r e  r e c e i v e d  by t h e  Act ion  Group from many f o r e i g n  
sources .  The Group dec ided  t o  r e j e c t  t h e s e  o f f e r s  and s t i c k  wi th  
t h e  equipment it knew b e s t  a s  it could  o n l y  c o n c e n t r a t e  on what 
it a l r e a d y  knew. Norway had a l r e a d y  developed c o a s t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  
booms and had t r i e d  them i n  t h e  open s e a s  i n  good weather .  Other  
equipment had been o rde red  b u t  never  t e s t e d .  
The g r e a t e s t  problem a r e a  i n  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  equipment employed 
was t h e  gap i n  performance between t h a t  s t a t e d  by t h e  manufacturer  
and t h a t  observed i n  a c t u a l  use .  Equipment wi th  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  
c a p a c i t y  of p i c k i n g  up 7,000-8,000 t o n s  of  o i l  p e r  day,  which 
exceeded t h e  e s t i m a t e d  f low of o i l  from t h e  blowout,  on ly  c o l l e c t e d  
20 t o n s  of o i l  t h e  f i r s t  day o f  i t s  a c t u a l  use .  [28]  T h e r e a f t e r ,  
t h e  equipment was r e p o r t e d  t o  be  25% e f f e c t i v e  under t h e  most i d e a l  
c o n d i t i o n s .  Other  equipment having a 4,000 t o n  r a t i n g  c o l l e c t e d  
only  100 t o n s  i n  a  day. Equipment used by P h i l l i p s  having a capa- 
c i t y  of 1,800 t o n s  a  day a l s o  proved t o  be 25% e f f e c t i v e .  Four 
Vikoma skimmers developed i n  t h e  UK by BP and employed by Sweden 
had a t h e o r e t i c a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  300 t o n s  p e r  day each b u t  only  c o l -  
l e c t e d  60 t o n s  i n  t o t a l  d u r i n g  t h e  t i m e  t h e y  w e r e  used.  [291 The 
on ly  skimmer t h a t  c o l l e c t e d  o i l  a s  r a t e d  i n  t h e  open s e a s  w i t h  n ine-  
f o o t  waves had been des igned and b u i l t  i n  Norway b u t  never  t e s t e d  
p r i o r  t o  i t s  a c t u a l  use .  I n  a l l ,  e i g h t  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  of  booms 
w e r e  t r i e d  and t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  skimmers. 
The e m u l s i f i e d  o i l  c o l l e c t e d  by t h i s  equipment t o t a l l e d  
1,700m3 which con ta ined  935m3 of  pure  o i l  ( abou t  800 t o n s ) .  The 
g r e a t e s t  amount c o l l e c t e d  i n  a  s i n g l e  day was 800m3 whi le  t h e  
l e a s t  c o l l e c t e d  was 60m3. [30] The t o t a l  amount o f  800 t o n s  of 
c o l l e c t e d  pure  o i l ,  of  course ,  cannot  begin  t o  compare wi th  t h e  
maximum t o t a l  of  21,300 t o n s  of o i l  which escaped through t h e  
blowout ( o n l y  3.7% of o i l  c o l l e c t e d ) .  Although waves w e r e  high 
and t h e  weather  cons ide red  bad f o r  booms and skimmers c o n d i t i o n s  
under which t h e  equipment was used w e r e  not  comple te ly  o u t  of  
l i n e  s i n c e  stormy c o n d i t i o n s  w e r e  n o t  p r e v a l e n t .  Most of  t h e  
equipment s imply f a i l e d  t o  work i n  t h e  open s e a  under less than  
i d e a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  [31] 
Another problem wi th  t h i s  equipment was t h e  s h e e r  number of 
many smal l  u n i t s  t o  be brought  t o g e t h e r  and a c t u a l l y  deployed i n  
an e f f e c t i v e  manner. Transpor t ,  booms, skimmers and personnel  
had t o  be found and matched t o  form an e f f o r t  capable  o f  c o n t a i n -  
i n g  and c o l l e c t i n g  t h e  o i l .  For  example, f o u r  b o a t s  cou ld  be 
r e q u i r e d  f o r  500 meters  of  boom: one a t  each end of t h e  boom, 
one t o  c o l l e c t  t h e  o i l  and one t o  t a k e  it away. I f  10,000 meters  
of booms a r e  used t h e  s h e e r  number of b o a t s  becomes v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  c o n t r o l .  Also some v e s s e l s  had maintenance problems, o t h e r s  
had i n s u f f i c i e n t  crew and s t i l l  o t h e r s  w e r e  t o o  underpowered t o  
remain i n  p l a c e  i n  h igh  s e a s .  Booms and skimmers of one des ign  
were d i f f i c u l t  t o  p u t  i n t o  p l a c e  and match wi th  o t h e r  d e s i g n s .  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of e f f e c t i v e  booms and skimmers w e r e  a v a i l -  
a b l e  t o  be used even i f  c o n d i t i o n s  were i d e a l .  The h e a v i e r  s l i c k  
approximated 1,500 square  k i lomete r s  i n  a r e a  and o n l y  6,100 meters  
w e r e  a c t u a l l y  p u t  t o  use  o r  on stand-by. p h i l l i p s  o rde red  2,000 
meters  of booms b u t  on ly  100 meters  p e r  day could be produced. 
F i n a l l y ,  personnel  were g e n e r a l l y  Giltrained i n  t h e  use  o f  such 
equipment. A l e a r n i n g  p e r i o d  was necessary  i n  o r d e r  f o r  personnel  
t o  l e a r n  t o  u s e  t h e  equipment e f f e c t i v e l y .  D i f f e r e n c e s  i n  op in ion  
e x i s t e d  over  whether t h e  equipment was i n e f f e c t i v e  i n  i t s e l f  o r  
rendered  i n e f f e c t i v e  through inadequa te ly  t r a i n e d  pe r sonne l .  A t  
p r e s e n t  an assessment  i s  underway t o  determine  t h e  e x t e n t  of 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  t h e  equipment, v e s s e l s  and communciations used. [32] 
The c o a s t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  m o b i l i z a t i o n  e f f o r t  was t h e  f i n a l  
minor d e c i s i o n  connected wi th  t h e  major d e c i s i o n  t o  reject 
chemicals  i n  favour of mechanical  c o l l e c t i o n .  The c o a s t a l  com- 
m u n i t i e s  were informed by t h e  S t a t e  P o l l u t i o n  Cont ro l  A u t h o r i t y  
t h a t  an o i l  s l i c k  was approaching t h e  Norwegian c o a s t .  The O s l o  
c e n t e r  of t h e  Agency a c t e d  t o  coord ina te  t h e  community e f f o r t s  
i n  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  s h o r e l i n e .  Communities w e r e  t o  
review t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s ,  e s t a b l i s h  emergency p l a n s  and s p e c i f y  
a r e a s  t o  be p r o t e c t e d .  The government a l s o  guaranteed t o  cover 
any expenses f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  emergency measures and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
i n  p r o t e c t i o n  and clean-up e f f o r t s .  No purchase  of  equipment was 
guaranteed.  Th i s  l a t t e r  d e c i s i o n  may have stopped s o m e  communities 
from o r d e r i n g  equipment t h a t  would have competed w i t h  t h e  produc- 
t i o n  c a p a c i t y  geared  t o  t h e  more immediate equipment needs a t  s e a .  
Although o i l  had a t  f i r s t  been expected t o  reach t h e  c o a s t  by 
A p r i l  26 it was no t  u n t i l  May 2 t h a t  t h e  e n t i r e  c o a s t a l  a r e a  t o  
be a f f e c t e d  was o rgan i sed .  Some c r i t i c i s m  was p u t  on t h e  n a t i o n a l  
government by t h e s e  communities bu t  t h e  Bravo blowout showed t h a t  
t h e s e  communities were g e n e r a l l y  i l l - p r e p a r e d  t o  respond adequa te ly  
t o  t h e  c o a s t a l  o i l - t h r e a t .  
The o t h e r  major d e c i s i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  t h e  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  
e f f o r t  involved l e t t i n g  t h e  o i l  s l i c k  j u s t  d r i f t  and n a t u r a l l y  
decompose a t  s e a  wi th  no e f f o r t  t o  mechanical ly c o l l e c t  o r  chemi- 
c a l l y  d i s p e r s e  t h i s  s l i c k .  Th i s  d e c i s i o n  was i n  one s e n s e  a  
"non-decision" i n  t h a t  t h e  Act ion  Group d i d  no t  want t o  i g n o r e  t h e  
s l i c k .  The d e c i s i o n  was n e c e s s i t a t e d  by t h e  s h e e r  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  
of coping wi th  t h e  s l i c k  v i a  mechanical means. Once t h e  s l i c k  
began t o  t h i n  o u t  and break up i n t o  i s o l a t e d  pa tches  over  such a 
wide a r e a  of t h e  s e a  it became t o o  expensive an o p e r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
given  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  mechanical d e v i c e s  used.  There fo re ,  
the ,combined i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  o i l  c o l l e c t i o n  equipment 
wi th  t h e  c o s t  of  mounting t h e  r e q u i r e d  e x t e n s i v e  a t t e m p t  t o  
c o l l e c t  t h e  o i l  became d e c i d i n g  f a c t o r s  i n  l e t t i n g  t h e  s l i c k  
d r i f t .  Added t o  t h e s e  two f a c t o r s  was t h e  p rognos i s  t h a t  t h e  
s l i c k  would remain a t  s e a ,  n a t u r a l l y  d i s i n t e g r a t e  and n o t  touch 
t h e  c o a s t l i n e .  F i n a l l y ,  only  a  chemical  d i s p e r s a n t  e f f o r t  would 
approach c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  and such a means had 
a l r e a d y  been r u l e d  o u t ,  a l though  chemicals  may have been used i f  
t h e  s l i c k  had approached t h e  shore .  
The mixing a c t i o n  o f  t h e  s e a  c o n t i n u a l l y  caused t h e  o i l  
s l i c k  t o  e v a p o r a t e  and d i s i n t e g r a t e .  On Flay 3 it was e s t i m a t e d  
t h a t  i n  ano the r  f i v e  t o  s i x  days  t h e  o i l  would be completely 
d i s i n t e g r a t e d ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  f i n a l  minor d e c i s i o n  was t h e  demob- 
i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  c o a s t a l  p r o t e c t i o n  e f f o r t  on t h a t  same day. 
Some r i s k  was involved i n  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  b u t  weather  f o r e c a s t s  
and t h e  s l i c k  movement and decomposition f o r e c a s t  w e r e  such t h a t  
t h e  e f f o r t  of  ma in ta in ing  a major s t a t e  of  r e a d i n e s s  was n o t  
worth t h e  c o s t  of t h i s  e f f o r t .  
KELL CONTROL DECISIONS 
The o t h e r  major d e c i s i o n  t h a t  stemmed from t h e  a u t h o r i t y  
g iven t o  t h e  Act ion  Group i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  P h i l l i p s  was a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  w e l l  c o n t r o l .  P h i l l i p s  was o rde red  t o  both  p r e s e n t  a  w e l l -  
capping p l a n  and t o  s t a r t  d r i l l i n g  a  r e l i e f  w e l l  a t  t h e  same 
t i m e .  [33] Such an ad  hoc w e l l  c o n t r o l  o p e r a t i o n  was necessary  
because no p l a n s  f o r  how t o  handle  a n  u n c o n t r o l l e d  w e l l  w e r e  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  e i t h e r  P h i l l i p s  o r  t h e  O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e .  [34] 
On i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e  P h i l l i p s  c a l l e d  i n  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of 
t h e  Red Adair  Company from t h e  US who a r e  i n d u s t r y  e x p e r t s  i n  
c o n t r o l l i n g  o i l  blowouts .  I t  took 24 hours  f o r  t h e  team t o  
a r r i v e  and be on t h e  Bravo p la t fo rm.  During t h e  approximate ly  
36 hour p e r i o d  s i n c e  t h e  blowout began no th ing  was done t o  a t t e m p t  
t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  f low o f  o i l .  S ince  t h e  g e n e r a l  i n d u s t r y  view is  
t h a t  each blowout i s  unique  [35] w e l l  c o n t r o l  procedures  do no t  
s e e m  t o  be i n  ev idence  once a  blowout h a s  occur red .  
With t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of  t h e  Red Adair  Company r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
P h i l l i p s '  e n g i n e e r i n g  s t a f f  developed a p l a n  f o r  t h e  capping 
procedure .  Both t h e  O i l  D i r e c t o r a t e  and t h e  Act ion  Group approved 
t h e  P h i l l i p s - A d a i r  p l a n .  The p l a n  was d i f f i c u l t  t o  implement 
because t h e  s u r f a c e  BOP v a l v e  was i n s t a l l e d  upside-down. [361 
T h i s  r e v e r s e d  p o s i t i o n  fo rced  a n  improv i sa t ion  of  t h e  equipment 
used t o  cap  t h e  w e l l .  A f t e r  s e v e r a l  u n s u c c e s s f u l  t r ies  ano the r  
improv i sa t ion  worked t o  c l o s e  o f f  t h e  w e l l  and a l l o w  t h e  pumping 
of  mud t o  s t a b l i z e  t h e  w e l l  p r e s s u r e .  When f i n a l l y  brought  under 
c o n t r o l  on A p r i l  30 a t  17.45 hours  t h e  w e l l  had been i n  a  s t a t e  
of  u n c o n t r o l  f o r  n e a r l y  e i g h t  days ,  s p i l l i n g  up t o  21,300 t o n s  
of o i l  i n t o  t h e  North Sea (a l though  t h e  a c t u a l  amount may be less) .  











